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T h e Dominant Peoples in 
History according to Grundtvig and Hegel
By Tord Ehnevid
A comparison between Grundtvig and Hegel can be justified on 
several grounds. Grundtvig was younger than Hegel by thirteen 
years and gained recognition and authority in his homeland much 
later than Hegel in Germany. Any historico-genetic connection be­
tween Grundtvig and Hegel can, therefore, be imagined in one 
direction only: from Hegel to Grundtvig, not from Grundtvig to 
Hegel. In searching through the Grundtvig material, however, one 
finds that Grundtvig’s views on Hegel’s philosophy are only briefly 
and rarely expressed. W hat he does say, moreover, is invariably 
unfavorable. The areas of contact between Grundtvig and Hegel 
appear to be so small that a comparison between them would seem 
to have little to yield from the historico-genetic point of view.
Looking at Grundtvig and Hegel today in the perspective of 
time, however, one immediately finds the grounds for comparison 
more productive. Both men have undergone a renaissance as sources 
of inspiration to those who are critical of the static one-sidedness 
of analytical philosophy. The trend today is for the concept of 
“history” to be replaced by that of “science”. Science includes 
analysis in vacuo according to certain rules of thought -  formal 
logic -  and experience based on so-called facts resulting from sy­
stematically varied experiments. Both Hegel and Grundtvig con­
sciously worked out their system of thought, rejecting the cultural 
tradition on which the static and mathematical character of the 
modern scientific ideal has been based. Thus Hegel seeks to re­
place so-called positive logic by negative logic. Grundtvig writes of 
chrono-logic. One is reminded in this connection of Grundtvig’s 
criticism of working methods according to which everything has
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to be measured. The “gauge” in Grundtvig’s usage is not only a 
reference to such systems but also a term for evil.
Logical empiricism has become the designation of a trend in 
philosophy which would reject both Hegel and Grundtvig as scient­
ists. If the term “logical empiricism” had not had this ideo-histori- 
cal connotation it would have aptly summed up Hegel’s and Grundt­
vig’s programme of ideas. Logic occupies an important place in the 
thinking of both of them. They regard logic, however, as something 
not static but dynamic. Logic is determined by motion, not rest; 
by time, not space. Nor is experience determined by space. Experi­
ence is temporal, historical. If it were not so it would shrink into 
so narrow a perspective as to become unscientific. History, therefore, 
is an appropriate term for an academic or scientific field, as in, for 
instance, the history of religion, of literature, of society, and so on.
With history occupying such a prominent place in Hegel’s and 
Grundtvig’s worlds of thought, it should be possible to discover 
the characteristic features of them both by studying the way in 
which each of them presents history. Both use the expression “the 
dominant peoples in history”. The study could, therefore, be narrow­
ed down to these peoples. In making their selection Grundtvig 
and Hegel applied the principles which they considered crucial to 
the progress of mankind. One obvious requirement with both of 
them was a clear movement forward in mankind’s history, not a 
cycle. A cycle is natural to space, not to temporal history.
Grundtvig’s dominant peoples are seven in number. Six are fam­
ous in history. The seventh can only be prophesied about. The six 
dominant peoples are in turn the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, 
the Anglo-Saxons, the Teutons and the Scandinavians. Hegel 
reckons with four dominant peoples: the Persians, the Greeks, the 
Romans and the Germans. As to the future, he makes no prophecy.
As will be seen, the peoples Grundtvig and Hegel have chosen 
are much the same. To Hegel’s Germans, who are mainly Teutons, 
may be added Grundtvig’s Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavians. This 
narrows the difference down to the first of the dominant peoples: 
in Hegel’s view the Persians, in Grundtvig’s the Hebrews. Hegel 
does in fact include the Hebrews among the Persians, since the 
kingdom of Persia also comprises the land of Canaan. The differen­
ce nevertheless remains. The Persians’ contribution to history is
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not of sufficient value in Grundtvig’s view to warrant them a place 
among the dominant peoples in history.
There is another respect in which Grundtvig’s and Hegel’s chains 
of dominant peoples differ. With Hegel the path of history is 
straighter. Each new dominant people brings a step forward. This 
is not the case with Grundtvig. From the Hebrews to the Romans 
is a step backward. W ith the Anglo-Saxons the march forward 
resumes and continues without interruption.
Neither to Grundtvig nor Hegel is the choice of dominant peoples 
arbitrary. The writing of history is not a self-chosen, critical and 
reflective process. Form and content are not separate. The writing 
of history is at one with the course of history. The writer of history 
moves, as it were, alongside the historical material. He is able to 
do so since he himself is part of time. The same forces are at work 
in him as in mankind. As a spiritual being he can move through 
history on the wings of the spirit. By doing so he can also deter­
mine which are the dominant peoples in history.
Self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) is not static but historical. 
It increases and develops as time progresses. History is a conscious 
process, like the individual’s life. The conscious process might 
equally well be described as a thought process. Thought obeys 
definite laws which are described in logic. To be oneself is to affirm 
oneself. The first proposition in logic is the proposition of identity. 
To affirm oneself is to deny what is not oneself. And so the second 
proposition in logic is formulated, the law of opposition.
To summarize: to be oneself is a conscious process, a thought 
process, a process, moreover, dependent on truth. The same logic 
is inherent in history, enabling the writer of history to understand 
history.
A person cannot be himself unless he is free to be himself. Iden­
tity implies the freedom to affirm oneself. Self-affirmation must 
come from within. Self-consciousness cannot be achieved by 
force. History, however, is well-known to contain many examples 
of force and other acts of compulsion against the individual. Such 
encroachments on freedom inhibit progress.
Freedom, therefore, characterizes the progress of history. Hegel 
likens freedom to the law of gravitation in nature. Objects seek a 
central point in free fall. In the world of the spirit freedom plays
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a similar role. But, unlike the material world, the spirit has its 
central point within itself. Self-consciousness is to realize that the 
nature of man is to be free and to work for the attainment of this 
freedom. Such thoughts lead Hegel to conclude: “World history 
is progress in the consciousness of freedom”.
To Grundtvig, too, freedom is a key word, even if he knows 
that it is capable of many meanings. “As slippery as an eel” he 
calls it. Freedom is the atmosphere in which truth, and therefore 
history, thrive, for history is an increment of truth. “Where the 
spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” is a saying of Grundtvig’s 
which is frequently quoted. Still clearer is the call for freedom in 
the following lines:
Only to Hell can man be forced; to Heaven he’s simply called;
Freedom follows the spirit of truth.
So far I have linked the principle of freedom as enunciated by 
both Hegel and Grundtvig to the individual in a way which might 
be misunderstood. The individual’s craving for freedom in order to 
realize his consciousness of self might be opposed to the interests 
of the general public and of mankind in general. Such an idea is 
foreign to both Hegel and Grundtvig. The individual can be him­
self only in community with others. To Grundtvig this community 
is the people. Hegel calls it the State.
A people, according to Grundtvig, are those having a common 
language. The hallmark of the individual is his language. In it 
reposes his likeness to God. God is the invisible Word. Man has 
been permitted to retain the W ord despite the Fall. By safeguarding 
his word he safeguards his humanity. A person’s word is always a 
word taken from a people’s language. In the mother tongue the 
spiritual lives of the individual and of the whole people find 
expression. Those people who have managed to retain and develop 
their community of language most successfully are counted the 
dominant peoples in history. Of the dominant peoples one has 
managed to achieve an importance of a negative kind in history. 
The Romans long impeded progress by forcing Latin on other 
peoples.
In Hegel’s view community of language is of minor significance. 
The crucial factor in a people is whether they form a State. “In 
world history the only peoples that matter are those that form a 
State”, for the State is “freedom come to realization”. Hegel reaches
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this conclusion because he attaches importance to man as a rational 
being. Reason rules the world and guides the progress of world 
history. The rational activities of individuals find expression in 
the laws and customs of the State, providing an instrument from 
which the world significance of a people can be determined.
In this connection it is interesting to compare Hegel’s and 
Grundtvig’s assessments of poetry and prose. Hegel praises the 
prosaic common sense of the Hebrews. Grundtvig, on the other 
hand, considers them poetic. The difference between Hegel and 
Grundtvig is most clearly expressed in their views on folk mytholo­
gy. In Grundtvig’s view a people’s history begins with their myths, 
which reflect the conditions prevailing amongst the people during 
what was probably their best period, their golden age. Being poetic, 
the language has continuity. When a people becomes prosaic it 
ceases to be significant in world history.
In Hegel’s view myths are external to history. “History is prosaic, 
and myths so far contain nothing of history.” Only by the use of 
abstract definitions can a people express itself in its laws. Prose 
is thus a prerequisite of the formation of a State. It might be said, 
in fact, that the more poetic a people the greater, in Grundtvig’s 
view, its role in world history. The more prosaic a people the 
greater, in Hegel’s view, its chances of making a contribution of 
world significance to politics. W ith Grundtvig “the living word” 
in history is the determining factor in assessing poetry and prose; 
with Hegel it is “reason”.
The time has now come to take a closer look at the various 
dominant peoples. Let us start with Grundtvig’s list. Grundtvig 
fixed the number of dominant peoples according to the seven 
Churches of the Book of Revelations, although general history is 
not normally determined by Christian attitudes. General history 
is part not of God’s work of salvation but of His work of creation. 
Grundtvig’s starting point is Deuteronomy 32, v. 8 f. God has set 
the bounds of the people according to the number of his angels. 
Each people has its own angel, “its good Spirit”. This Spirit works 
in the language of the people. The closer a people’s language 
approximates to the original Divine language, the greater the signi­
ficance of that people in history.
The Hebrew  people stands in a special position since their lan­
guage is kyriological, i. e. the Lord’s own language. It is the
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language which is least corrupted. But, seen from Grundtvig’s time, 
it has the misfortune of being a dead language. The significance of 
Israel in world history is intensified by the fact that the Old Testa­
ment history of Israel also illuminates the history of other peoples. 
Grundtvig mentions the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, 
the Medes and the Persians.
After the Hebrews come the Greeks. From the wealth of their 
literature the significance “the living W ord” once had for them 
is clear. Just as the Old Testament was written in Hebrew, so it 
followed that the New Testament was written in Greek. The strugg­
les of the Greeks for freedom in antiquity acquired fresh topicality 
in Grundtvig’s time, when the Greeks succeeded in liberating 
themselves from the domination of the Turks.
When the Romans deprived the Greeks of their freedom the 
Greeks ceased to write in poetry. Latin grammar crushed the living 
language of the conquered people. For centuries Latin was the 
language of church and school. The Romans’ conception of man 
was, in Grundtvig’s view consistent with their lust for conquest. 
According to legend, the founder of Rome was descended from 
a she-wolf.
The period of spiritual greatness of the Angles is associated with 
such names as the venerable Bede and Alcuin. From the Angles 
missionaries went out to Germany (St. Boniface) and the North. 
Grundtvig had himself worked on the epic poem, “Beowulf”, a 
further indication of the force of “the living word” once in England.
With Luther the Germans became one of the dominant peoples 
in history. The Germans received the Bible in their own language. 
Latin gave way in church services to the language of the people. 
Hymns began to be sung in the vernacular.
The sixth of the dominant peoples are the Scandinavians, in 
particular the Danes. Nordic mythology is unique. No other people 
has pondered so deeply over the mystery of life and has sought 
so intensively the answer in the mists of time as the Scandinavians 
have done. Yggdrasill, the vast ash-tree which is the entire universe, 
has no counterpart in detail and poetic power in the mythology of 
any other people. Thanks to Grundtvig these powerful myths have 
gained renewed life on the lips of the people.
In the seventh of the dominant people, which is still to come, 
the spirit of community will flourish. They will sing in the full
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fervour of their native tongue. Grundtvig prophesies that the 
people of the future will be the Indians.
Hegel’s divining-rod for finding the dominant peoples in history 
is reason rather than “the living word”. As the sun illuminates the 
earth from east to west so Hegel sees history developing from east 
to west. In the “oriental world” there is no history at first since no 
change is possible. Change presupposes consciouness of “the 
contrast between an objective existence and the subjective move­
ment alongside it”. In China the substantial spirit and the individual 
spirit are regarded as a natural unit. The individual spirit does not 
recognize its own freedom. Freedom is not a subject for thought. 
It will not produce a state constitution. Nor in the field of religion 
is it reasonable to differentiate between the objective spirit and 
nature. The concept of “tien” comprises both heaven and nature.
India, too is static. Unlike China, India is ruled by idealism. But 
it is “an idealism without ideas born of the imagination”. India’s 
spirit is dreaming, the result being that the individual does not feel 
himself to be detached from things. In China the State was all; in 
India the People are all. In neither case does the individual 
recognize himself as being self-conscious. Nor do the people come 
to consciousness, this being possible only through the history of 
the people’s laws and customs.
In the oriental world a historic people first appears with the 
arrival of the Persians. Zoroaster’s concept of light implies con­
sciousness of a spirit standing in relation to something else, namely 
darkness. The contrast between light and darkness implies action 
and life. History can begin. According to Hegel the conquest of the 
Semitic Middle East by the Persians will have historic consequences 
for the world. The Middle East is the home of traders with an 
industrial economy who ship their products across the sea. For the 
first time man’s industry and reason are more important than na­
ture and her products. Thanks to industry man loses his fear of 
nature and finds an aim in life within himself. Through their con­
nection with the Persians the Jews also contribute to world history. 
The light of the Persians, which still describes spiritual things in 
sensual terms, can give way to the abstract principle of Jahve 
(Jehova), the one and only. Nature is reduced to a creation of 
Jahve. Only the spirit is truth. Thought is free to formulate true 
morality and justice according to God’s will. But the absolute has
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still to be conceived as a concrete spirit, and so the subject is not 
concretely free either. The Egyptians’ contribution to the liberation 
of the spirit is the concept of the immortality of the spirit.
With the Greeks the individual liberates himself entirely from 
all ties with nature. The law, rather than the family, is now the 
basis of the community. The Greeks make use of nature but trans­
form it into spirituality. Stone becomes a spiritual work of art. 
The “forms of beautiful individuality” are classified by Hegel 
into three divisions. The first he calls subjective works of art, 
comprising tools, games, jewellery and singing. Objective works 
of art comprise the Greek’ conception of the Gods as material 
beings, as real people. Finally there is the political work of art, the 
State, which combines within it both the subjective and the objec­
tive works of art. The State’s constitution is a democracy, in which 
individuals can develop their freedom to create laws, which are 
regarded as beneficial. Socrates, in Hegel’s view, was the inventor 
of morality, having demanded that people shall be conscious of 
their actions.
The Romans created abstract freedom in the abstract State. This 
abstract State has its counterpart on the individual level in the 
personality, which, says Hegel, is not the same thing as indivi­
duality. Personality is the basic attribute of justice and has its 
clearest manifestation in private property. The abstract State, with 
its personalities, i. e. individual abstract freedom, pays no regard 
to the living spirit and its individuals. It pursues its aim -  domina­
tion -  ruthlessly. As an example of the cold abstraction of domina­
tion Hegel cites Cato’s advice to the Senate: Ceterum censeo Car- 
thaginem esse delendam.
The abstract State and civil law together led the Roman Empire 
to the brink of dissolution. The absolute ruler was a “monas mona- 
dum” in relation to the private individuals, their subjects. Chri­
stianity, by contrast, achieved reconciliation between the higher 
spirit and the individual. Man, who is himself a spirit, is present 
in his absolute object, in the truth, in God. In the Germanic world 
this reconciliation is transferred to society in its entirety.
Church and State represent two different principles standing in 
opposition to each other. During the first period of the Germanic 
world down to Charles the Great the spiritual and the worldly are 
two aspects of the same thing. The second period brings tension
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between theocracy and the feudal monarchy. The triumph of the 
monkish ideal means the negation of morality. The monk’s vows 
of poverty, chastity and obedience were by implication a disparage­
ment of work, marriage and freedom. The Reformation introduces 
the third period, in which the State and Church, justice and reli­
gion, are reconciled. Marriage becomes moral. With Luther’s view 
of work, industry and craftsmanship also become moral. Everyone 
has a conscience and is free to obey it. Protestantism gradually 
obtains a State, Prussia, which will defend it. The next stage in 
history is the Age of Enlightenment. W hat Luther described as a 
phenomenon revealed in history by religion now becomes part of 
the age. As Luther expresses it, the conquest of spiritual freedom 
and the concrete reconciliation takes place in man himself. During 
the Age of Enlightenment this philosophical principle is establi­
shed abstractly in all its universality. The principle consists of the 
combination of opposition and identity into one fundamental prin­
ciple. During the final stage of history this principle will be reali­
zed in the realm of the wills. The will is free when it wills itself,
i. e. when the individual wills will the general will. “The will 
willing itself is the basis of all justice and of all commitments and 
therefore of all laws.”
Hegel thus bases his conception of history on a philosophical 
principle. The two principal laws of logic, the law of identity and 
the law of opposition, determine the course of events. Grundtvig, 
too, sees history as a revealer of “the principle of truth”, which is 
the single name he uses for the law of identity and the law of 
opposition. It is at this very point, however, that Grundtvig 
attacks Hegel’s concept. In “Budstikke i Høj norden” Grundtvig 
writes that the German’s God is reason, raising itself above affir­
mation and denial “on Hegelian jacks”. “Affirmation and denial 
against each other cannot make one”, as Grundtvig had already 
declared in Dannevirke. But this is what happens with Hegel. 
Hegel uses the order “opposition and identity” in his philosophy 
of history. Immediacy, i. e. unconscious identity, makes a people 
unhistoric (e. g. China). Only by conscious negation are movement, 
change and history imparted. Hegel’s analysis of the Fall follows 
the same line. “Paradise is a park where only animals, not men, 
may be”. The natural person, like animals, is neither good nor bad. 
The conscious person, on the other hand, differentiates between the
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ego with “its infinite freedom as its conditions” and “the pure 
content of the will, good”. Hegel refers to the Fall as “the eternal 
history of the spirit”. Only when man has experienced himself as 
himself, i. e. as a spirit, in the Fall, does he become a real person. 
But at he same time he separates himself in his abstract freedom 
from the universal divine spirit. And in doing so he finds himself 
in evil. Knowledge of the difference between good and evil thus 
constitutes evil but is also the driving force whereby man seeks 
reconciliation. On the path to knowledge man finally achieves this 
reconciliation, first through the revelation in Christ and then as a 
willing will.
To Grundtvig such an interpretation of the Fall is absurd. The 
essence of the Fall is man’s greater belief in the power which makes 
God a liar than in the God of truth. Man cannot possibly come nearer 
the truth by making common cause with the lying devil. On the 
contrary, man rejects the devil before speaking the language of 
truth in the creed of God’s people. This attitude to God and against 
the devil also applies to those who do not belong to God’s people. 
To speak one’s own language and to preserve it is to affirm the 
language one has received from God, even if subsequently it 
should have become corrupted. In seeking to imitate the language 
of others one is affirming a power hostile to God.
Despite his consciousness of the distance separating him from 
the Hegelians’ view of the Fall, Grundtvig is ready in the name 
of spiritual freedom to carry the discussion further. For Grundtvig 
sees the positive aspect of Hegel’s recognition of the historical 
data as “the essential starting point”. W ith his conception that man 
can redeem his Fall in a natural way, Hegel in Grundtvig’s view 
joins the naturalists, In schools Grundtvig can visualize competi­
tion between his own attitude and Hegel’s. History, of course, 
provides a basis for both attitudes.
The goal of history in Hegel’s view was a form of State in which 
State and Church supported each other. Both cherished the prin­
ciple of reconciliation and mediation. The general will would be 
reconciled with the individual wills. Any such line of thought was 
foreign to Grundtvig. The people of God, God’s free assembly, 
could of course influence a worldly people so that their language 
and mode of thought became more fervent and heartfelt. By virtue 
of its constitution a free National Church could smooth relations
125
between ecclesiastical and state bodies in the most effective manner 
possible. But towards the end of history it would nevertheless be­
come apparent that State and Church were irreconcilably opposed 
to each other. In the final conflict of history between God and 
the devil, truth and lies, only those who were part of God’s people 
could survive.
Grundtvig believes that, with his dialectics, Hegel has himself 
proved that truth in the form of identity is the eternal truth. “Truth 
cannot be denied without thereby being confirmed”. Høirup deser­
ves the credit for having extracted from Krønnike-Rim in his 
doctoral thesis this pronouncement of Grundtvig’s. It is interesting 
to see how Grundtvig puts Hegel on a par here with “the Holy 
Roman Empire” which will both “be and not be”. In Hegel’s 
account of history the Holy Roman Empire constituted the first 
phase in the historical development of the Germanic world. But 
it is only with Luther as the defender of the individual’s conscience 
and with Prussia as State protector of Protestantism that, according 
to Hegel, reconciliation is achieved between State and Church.
In his brief explanation of the implications of Hegel’s dialectics, 
Grundtvig has shown what unites and what divides them. To both 
Grundtvig and Hegel logic and history are indissolubly linked. 
The principle of truth is the basis of the conceptions of them both. 
According to classical logic the principle of truth consists of three 
laws: identity, opposition, and the law of the excluded middle. 
Grundtvig keeps them in this order. With Hegel opposition, nega­
tion, forms the starting point. Only then does identity follow. And 
there is no room for the law of the excluded middle.
Logic leads Grundtvig to history’s goal, where truth, as identity, 
remains the sole victor. Hegel’s logic leads to the attainment of 
history’s goal; negation remains latent (as exclusion?), while the op­
posites are reconciled in a higher identity. Logic, too, then becomes 
the instrument involved in the selection of the dominant peoples 
in history. Both “the word” in Grundtvig’s writing of history and 
reason in Hegel’s follow the laws of logic. Chrono-logic and dia­
lectics take care of the time dimension in mankind’s existence.
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